View Notes – CNSSP National Policy on Public Standards for Secure Sharing NSS from CIS at University of Florida. controlled in accordance with Reference g, and CNSSP No. CNSSP No. 5. Applicable space systems shall incorporate information. (U) Committee on National Security Systems Policy Number 15 (CNSSP 15), National. Information Assurance Policy on the Use of Public.
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This abrupt change of course, following many years of promoting ECC, cnsssp the cryptographic community by surprise. A paper by Neal Koblitz and Alfred Menezes discussed six different theories that were proposed to explain the timing of the announcment and the changes in the approved list of algorithms.
The Information Assurance Directorate at the NSA
NSA has recently published a document in the form of a list of Frequently Asked Questions FAQs that tries to dispel the mystery and put to rest the conspiracy theories.
It does a good job of that, except for one important detail: Several details also deserved explanation: The announcements themselves provided some explanations, and the FAQs document do a more thorough job, failing only to explain the omission of DSA.
NSS equipment is often used for 30 years or more. National security information intelligence value is often 30 years sometimes morealthough it may vary depending on classification, sensitivity, and subject. The retreat from requiring exclusive use of NIST elliptic curves for public key cryptography is explained by a desire to save money: Both the resistance to the adoption of ECC and the shift to other elliptic curves can be explained at least in part by the Snowden revelations, and in particular by the confirmation of the backdoor in the Dual Elliptic Curve DRBG.
Dual Elliptic Curve DRBG makes use of a group of points of an elliptic curve, but a DRBG could be similarly implemented on any group where the discrete log problem is hard, and a backdoor could be similarly constructed on any such implementation.
NSA Suite B Cryptography
The FAQs make three points to explain the timing of cnss announcements: The details are explained as follows. The motivation to eliminate the SECRET tier is attributed to technological advances that reduce the need for less computationally demanding algorithms at the SECRET level and thus provide an opportunity to resolve interoperability problems caused by having two tiers. These explanations demystify the changes made last summer, but do not address the omission of DSA from the list of approved algorithms.
I suppose it was omitted simply because it is not being used, and no explanation was provided because nobody asked for one. Historically, DSA has not been popular for several reasons. It was specified by NSA, and there were concerns that it might have a backdoor.
JEP 129: NSA Suite B Cryptographic Algorithms
It must be combined with DH for secure connection establishment, whereas RSA can be used by itself for key transport, which gives a great advantage in terms of ccnssp. It is randomized, which was viewed by developers as complicating implementation. In spite of all this, DSA was included in most cryptographic libraries and most security protocols.
But now it has been omitted from the draft of TLS 1. This comes at the wrong time, now that most of the drawbacks of DSA are going away:. DSA is now the best option for cryptographic client authenticationand in particular for client authentication with an uncertified key pair, which is becoming popular as a password replacement.
This generated hostility in the nineties; but today it fnssp be viewed as an advantage, because it means that DSA is not subject to the export restrictions on encryption software, which have been relaxed but are still burdensome. A DSA signature requires less computation than an RSA signature with a full-size private exponent, and cnsssp computation means more battery life in chssp devices.
RSA signatures can be sped up by using a less-than-full-size private exponent, but that forces a full-size public exponent on the verifier. If DSA is not being used, nothing is disrupted by dropping it. But the standardization process announced in the NIST report on post-quantum cryptography will take time. According to the NIST report, it will allow 3 to 5 years of public scrutiny, after proposals of quantum-resistant algorithms are submitted late in Therefore standardized quantum-resistant algorithms may not be available until In the meantime, commercial systems using DSA may well appear in the commercial marketplace.
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The security strengths provided by Cnsspp and P are and bits respectively, while the security strength provided by AES is equal to the bitlength of the key. A bit modulus provides a security strength of bits for RSA and DH, while a bit modulus provides a security strength of bits. It omitted DSA altogether from the new list of approved algorithms.
It permitted the use of key establishment without forward secrecy, which was prohibited in Suite B. One of the questions in the FAQs document first question on page 10 confirms that the CNSA Suite does intend to retreat from the forward secrecy requirement. This comes at the wrong time, now that most of the drawbacks of DSA are going away: After 30 years of public scrutiny, nobody suspects DSA of having a backdoor.
Intuitively, I find it hard to imagine where such a backdoor could be hidden, whereas there seem to be potential hiding places for backdoors in ECC. And cryptographic random bit generators are becoming available to developers in all computing environments.
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